Most
firms have annual bonus plans aimed at motivating the short-term
performance of managers and executives. Short term bonuses can easily
result in plus or minus adjustments of 25% or more to total pay. There
are three basic issues to consider when awarding short term incentives:
eligibility, fund size, and individual awards.
Eligibility: Most
firms opt for broad eligibility – they include both top and
lower-level managers and mainly decide who’s eligible in one of two
ways. Based on one survey about 25% of companies decide eligibility
based on job level or job title. About 54% decide eligibility based on a
combination of factors, including job level/title, base salary level,
and discretionary considerations such as identifying key jobs that have a
measurable impact on profitability. Base salary level alone is the sole
determinant in less then 3% of the companies polled.
The size of
the bonus is usually greater for top-level executives. Thus, executive
earning $150,000 in salary may be able to earn another 80% of his or her
salary as a bonus, while a manager in the same firm earning $80,000 can
earn only another 30%. Similarly, a supervisor might be able to earn up
to 15% of his or her base salary in bonuses. Average bonuses range from
a low of 10% to a high of 80% or more. A typical company might
establish a plan whereby executives could earn 45% of base salary,
managers 25%, and supervisory personnel 12%.
Fund Size: the firm
must also decide the total amount of bonus money to make available fund
size. Some use a nondeductible formula. They use a straight percentage
usually of the company’s net income to create the short term incentive
fund. Others use a deductible formula, on the assumption that the fund
should start to accumulate only after the firm has met a specified level
of earnings. Some firms don’t use a formula at all, but make that
decision on a totally discretionary basis.
There are no
hard-and-fast rules about proportion of profits to pay out. One
alternative is to reserve a minimal amount of the profits, say, 10% for
safeguarding stockholders’ investments and then to establish a fund
for bonuses equal to, say 20% of the corporate operating profit before
taxes in excess of this base amount. Thus, if the operating profits were
$200,000 them the management bonus fund might be 20% of $180,000 or
$36,000. Other illustrative formulas used for determining the executive
bonus fund are as follows:
1. Ten percent of net income after deducting 5% of average capital invested in business.
3. Twelve percent of net earnings after deducting 6% of net capital.
Individual
Awards: The third task is deciding the actual individual awards.
Typically, a target bonus as well as maximum amount, perhaps double the
target bonus is set for each eligible position, and the actual award
reflects the person’s performance. The firm computes performance
ratings for each manager, computes preliminary total bonus estimates,
and compares the total amount of money required with the bonus fund
available. If necessary, it then adjusts the individual bonus estimates.
One
question is whether managers will receive bonuses based on individual
performance, corporate performance, or both. The basic rule should be:
outstanding managers should receive at least their target bonuses, and
marginal ones should receive at best below-average awards. Firms usually
tie top-level executive bonuses to overall corporate results or
divisional results if the executive heads a major division. But as one
moves farther down the chain of command, corporate profit become a less
accurate gauge of a manager’s contribution. Supervisors or the heads
of functional departments, it often makes more sense to tie the bonus to
individual performance.
Many firms tie short term bonuses to both
organizational and individual performance. Perhaps the simplest way is
the split-award method, which breaks the bonus into two parts. Here the
manager actually gets two separate bonuses, one based on his or her
individual effort and one based on the organization’s overall
performance. Thus, a manager might be eligible for an individual
performance bonus of up to $10,000, but receive only $2,000 at the end
of the year, based on his or her individual performance evaluation. But
the person might also receive a second bonus of $3,000 based on the
firm’s profits for the year. Give the money you save from the poor
performers to the outstanding ones.
One drawback to this approach
is that it may give marginal performers too much – for instance,
someone could get a company-based bonus, even if his or her open
performance is mediocre. One way to get around this is to use the
multiplier method. In other words, make the bonus a product of both
individual and corporate performance. A manager whose own performance is
poor does not even receive the company-based bonus.